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REVIEW ARTICLE 
How to Be Persuasive in Literary Theory: 
The Case of Wolfgang lser 
Wolfgang lser's latest book, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic 
Response (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), is a persuasive 
book indeed. I have little doubt that it will be welcomed by American literary 
critics who are attempting to incorporate "the reader" into a critical tradition 
long preoccupied with the autonomous text. For most I iterary theorists, the 
question is no longer whether the reader's interaction with the text should be 
discussed but how. lser's new book, a translation of his 1976 Der Akt des 
Lesens, will find a comfortable place within these contemporary debates over 
readers reading. But why should this reader-centered "book of Germanic 
phenomenology" be so easily adaptable to the American critical tradition, a 
tradition long dominated by the objectivist theorizing of New Critical for· 
malism? In other words, why is The Act of Reading a persuasive book? 
Of course, my opening remarks already suggest one answer to this ques-
tion: The Act of Reading appears in the United States at a time when many 
American theorists are aggressively promoting the reader's role in creating the 
literary work and still others are emphasizing the effects of the text on its real 
and ideal audiences. Reader-oriented critics like Louise Rosenblatt, Stanley 
Fish, Stephen Booth, Norman Holland, and David Bleich place the interaction 
of reader and text at the center of their otherwise very different literary 
theories. Jonathan Culler's Structuralist Poetics, a most useful introduction to 
structuralism, transforms this continental import into an account of readers' 
"literary competence," which consists of reading conventions for naturalizing 
literary texts. Even American versions of deconstruction include some mention 
of readers; in describing his Nietzschean premises, J. Hillis Miller writes: "The 
reading of a work involves an active intervention on the part of the reader. 
Each reader takes possession of the work for one reason or another and 
imposes on it a certain pattern of meaning." This recent concern for readers 
within American criticism is paralleled by the return of rhetoric to literature 
departments. Whether that rhetoric is composition theory or the "New 
Rhetoric" of Perelman, Burke, Weaver, and Richards, the discipline of literary 
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studies discovers in its return a revitalized interest in the effect (persuasive and 
otherwise) that texts have upon their reading audiences. Influencing, and 
influenced by, this resurrection of rhetoric, reader-oriented theory attempts to 
find new ways for describing how literature affects its readers during and after 
the reading process. 
lser's new book, a theoretical companion to his The Implied Reader (1974), 
offers contemporary American criticism a detailed model of aesthetic response 
by describing the reading process and the effects of that process. This account 
of reading begins with a functionalist model of the literary text, which focuses 
on two interrelated areas, the intersection between text and social reality and 
the interaction between text and reader. lser does not take a strictly mimetic 
position in discussing the relation between the literary text and reality: for 
him, literature does more than simply reflect or represent society; it responds 
to its deficiencies. "In general, literary texts constitute a reaction to contem-
porary situations, bringing attention to problems that are conditioned though 
not resolved by contemporary norms." One of literature's basic functions is 
"to reveal and perhaps even balance the deficiencies resulting from prevailing 
[thought] systems." For example, the eighteenth-century novel and drama 
were preoccupied with questions of morality; this preoccupation "balanced 
out the deficiencies of the dominant thought system of the time," Lockean 
empiricism, which called into question the traditional assumptions guiding 
human conduct without providing new ethical premises to replace them. In 
effect, "literature supplies those possibilities which have been excluded by the 
prevalent system." Literature accomplishes this, however, not by formulating 
these possibilities in the text but by causing the reader to formulate them for 
himself. 
Here we move from the intersection of text and reality to the interaction 
of reader and text. Literature entangles the reader "in the situation to which 
the text is a reaction." The author extracts social and historical norms (and 
references to past literature) from their original contexts and places them 
together to form the "repertoire of the text." In a novel, these "deprag-
matized" norms are distributed among various textual "perspectives" - the 
narrator, the characters, the plot, and the fictitious reader - and the system 
of perspectives they form outlines the author's view without stating it and 
provides the potential structure for the reader to actualize. The connections 
among the various perspectives emerge during the reading process, "in the 
course of which the reader's role is to occupy shifting vantage points that are 
geared to a prestructured activity and to fit the diverse perspectives into a 
gradually evolving pattern" that forms the "configurative meaning" of the 
text. This convergence of the textual perspectives functions as the standpoint 
from which the reader formulates the text's reaction to its social and histori-
cal environment. This reaction is not explicit in the text itself; rather, during 
the reading process the text becomes a "set of instructions" for the reader's 
production of the text's reaction, the author's view, the meaning of the liter-
ary work. Thus, by presenting familiar norms in unfamiliar arrangements, the 
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literary text points up the deficiencies of those norms and manipulates the 
reader into formulating a reaction to these deficiencies. lser gives Fielding's 
Tom Jones as an example of a detail of this process: Fielding presents 
Allworthy as a representative of perfect Christian benevolence, but then he 
juxtaposes the Allworthy perspective to Blifil, whom the reader comes to see 
as the embodiment of hypocritical piety. But why does Allworthy trust Blifil? 
The reader soon draws the conclusion that Allworthy is naive and impractical 
in that his "perfection is simply incapable of conceiving a mere pretence of 
ideality." Fielding has forced the reader to this conclusion though he has not 
stated it in the text itself. The reader combines the various perspectives -
Allworthy, Blifil, and the plot- into a "consistent gestalt" which resolves the 
tensions that resulted from the juxtaposition of the perspectives. But, again, 
"this gestalt is not explicit in the text-it emerges from a projection of the 
reader, which is guided in so far as it arises out of the identification of the 
connections between the signs." 
lser's model of the reading process is much more complex than what I have 
presented so far. I will return later to at least one more aspect of it. But for 
now I will restrict myself to the short· and long-term effects of reading that 
lser describes. For lser, reading is not a one-way process in which the passive 
reader merely internalizes the structures in the text; rather, it is a "dynamic 
interaction" in which the active reader is constantly responding to the mean-
ings he produces in this interaction. Consistency-building and image-making 
are continual reading activities guided by the text; the configurative meaning 
must be assembled by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what he 
has assembled. The result of this literary effect involves a restructuring of the 
reader's experience, a phenomenon which occurs most forcibly in the reading 
of those texts that incorporate the norms that the reader already holds. Here 
the deficiencies that the text forces the reader to locate and resolve are 
deficiencies in the reader's own structuring of experience. A reader open to 
the text and its effects will have to reformulate his system of norms in order 
to accommodate the meaning the text has led him to assemble. Thus, the act 
of reading literature provides "an experience which entails the reader consti-
tuting himself by constituting a reality hitherto unfamiliar to himself." It is in 
this way that literature significantly changes its readers. 
Like others before him, lser makes a distinction between meaning and 
significance. "Meaning is the referential totality which is implied by the as-
pects contained in the text and which must be assembled in the course of 
reading. Significance is the reader's absorption of the meaning into his own 
existence." lser's account provides for differing concretizations (meanings) of 
the same text and for different applications (significances) of the meanings 
assembled. But his phenomenology of reading is concerned primarily with 
describing the general structure of concretization and not the specific, histori-
cal actualizations of that structure. Thus, he distinguishes his theory of aesthe-
tic response from the theory of reception (which is an account dealing with 
"existing readers, whose reactions testify to certain historically conditioned 
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experiences of literature"). Similarly, lser is more interested in the structure 
of potential applications rather than the actual ways literary meanings have 
been applied in the experiences of historical readers or groups of readers. 
Because of these emphases in The Act of Reading, there are, by design, few 
examples of conflicting interpretations of the same text and few specific 
examples of significant changes produced in actual readers by literature. I find 
this exclusion disappointing because by constantly refusing to discuss conflict· 
ing responses and actual examples of change, lser talks about potential, pre· 
structured effects on readers in a way that at times closely resembles very 
traditional discussions of texts in isolation. As we will see in a moment, this 
disguised talk of texts becomes another aspect of I ser's persuasiveness within 
American critical discourse. 
Nevertheless, lser's account of the reading process and literary effects does 
offer much of real value to contemporary critical theory and its emerging 
concern with the reader's response to literature. This is one reason The Act of 
Reading will be welcomed by American critics and theorists. However, I will 
make a stronger claim: among the theoretical models of reading now being 
promoted in this country, lser's has the best chance of persuading the most 
people to adopt its shape and contents. The reason I make such a prediction 
has less to do with the present interest in readers and more to do with the 
critical tradition in which this interest is currently manifested. Put simply, 
lser's book will persuade not only because of what it says about readers but 
perhaps even more decisively because of what it does (and doesn't) say about 
texts. 
The Act of Reading and the American critical tradition share some basic 
assumptions about literary texts, and these common assumptions constitute 
the main source of lser's persuasive power within American critical discourse. 
However, these shared premises are often covered over by lser's rhetoric of 
reading and his critique of certain influential forces in recent American 
theory. For example, lser's direct attack on Anglo-American New Criticism is 
especially revealing for what it suggests about his hidden agreements with 
aspects of the hegemonic position he is attacking. 
lser places his critique of New Criticism in the context of a more general 
attack on the "classical norm of interpretation," which he characterizes as an 
outdated mode of referential analysis searching for an extractable meaning in 
the text (instead of a meaning experienced by the reader). This extractable 
meaning is at the service of a mimetic truth and manifests itself in the text as 
a harmonized totality of balance, order, and completeness. lser writes that 
New Criticism marked "a turning-point in literary interpretation" to the 
extent that it rejected "the vital elements of the classical norm, namely, that 
the work is an object containing the hidden meaning of a prevailing truth." In 
place of the search for the hidden message and representational meaning, New 
Criticism was concerned with "the elements of the work and their inter-
action," with the functions operating within the text. But lser points out that 
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despite this important rev1s1on in the critical tradition, New Criticism still 
preserved the classical norm of harmony, which took on "a value of its own, 
whereas in the past it was subservient to the appearance of truth." This 
harmonizing of textual elements with its discovery and eventual removal of 
ambiguities was "the unacknowledged debt of New Criticism to the classical 
norm of interpretation," and it was here that New Criticism set and reached 
its limits. New Critics attempted to define the functions of the literary text 
through the same interpretive norm - harmony - used to uncover represen· 
tational meaning. But "a function is not a meaning - it brings about an 
effect, and this effect cannot be measured by the same criteria as are used in 
evaluating the appearance of truth." lser's functionalist model of the text and 
his phenomenology of reading attempt to move beyond New Critical limita-
tions. However, his theory's relationship to New Criticism is similar to the 
complicitous relation he describes between New Criticism and the classical 
norm of interpretation: New Critics rejected the classical norm while preserv-
ing its value of harmony; lser rejects New Criticism while preserving its 
assumption of a prior and independent text. As I will show, lser's continued 
valorization of the text affects his theory just as crucially as the preservation 
of harmony limited the New Criticism. 
It is not simply the general valorization of the text that signals a disguised 
continuity between lser's functionalist theory and the critical tradition that 
New Criticism represents. A more surprising I ink is the role played by Polish 
philosopher Roman I ngarden and his phenomenology of the literary work. 
Rene Wellek and Austin Warren's 1949 study, Theory of Literature, crystal-
lized the American movement toward intrinsic criticism, a movement domi-
nated by New Criticism. Wellek made acknowledged use of I ngarden in his 
central chapter, "The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art," in which 
he defined a poem as a "system of norms" consisting of "several strata, each 
implying its own subordinate group"; lngarden outlined these strata in section 
eight of The Literary Work of Art. lngarden's stratified view of the literary 
work formed the foundation of Wellek and Warren's theory of intrinsic criti-
cism, and the Theory of Literature, in turn, became one of the most influen-
tial theoretical statements for the dominant force in American criticism. 
lser's theory of reading has a two-fold relation to lngarden's phenomen-
ology and to Wellek and Warren's Theory of Literature. lser borrows many 
of lngarden's concepts - concretization, schematized aspects, sentence corre-
lates, places of indeterminacy, the depragmatized character of fictional lan-
guage. But lser's initial use of lngarden differs from Wellek's: lser emphasizes 
the model of reading given fullest treatment in lngarden's The Cognition of 
the Literary Work of Art, while Wellek used only the model of the work 
presented in lngarden's much earlier book, The Literary Work of Art. Further-
more, lser criticizes lngarden's account and considerably revises it. For exam-
ple, he praises lngarden for proposing the idea of concretization but critiques 
its development in lngarden's theory, where "concretization was just the 
actualization of the potential elements of the work - it was not an inter-
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action between text and reader; this is why [lngarden's] 'places of indeter-
minacy' lead only to an undynamic completion, as opposed to a dynamic 
process" in which the reader is made to switch textual perspectives and estab-
lish connections between them. 
But a second criticism of lngarden by lser signals a more subtle relation to 
lngarden's theory (and ultimately a closer connection to the critical tradition 
Wellek and Warren represent). lser lists as one of the major drawbacks of 
lngarden's account the fact that I ngarden "is unable to accept the possibility 
that a work may be concretized in different, equally valid, ways." Wellek's use 
of lngarden was motivated by the very characteristic that lser seems to be 
rejecting here. Wellek wrote that "we can distinguish between right and wrong 
readings of a poem, or between a recognition or a distortion of the norms 
implicit in a work of art, by acts of comparison, by a study of different false 
or incomplete realizations .... A hierarchy of viewpoints, a criticism of the 
grasp of norms, is implied in the concept of the adequacy of interpretation." 
Adequacy, or validity, in interpretation represents an overriding concern for 
the American critical tradition. This concern has grown in recent years be-
cause of the challenge from reader-response and post-structuralist theories. In 
a 1978 essay in Critical Inquiry, Wellek responded to these new onslaughts 
against interpretive adequacy. characterizing them as "the new anarchy which 
allows a complete liberty of interpretation." In a recent issue of The Sewanee 
Review, Cleanth Brooks, another respected advocate of intrinsic criticism, has 
communicated more colorfully the continuing fear of "what can happen when 
there is a lack of theoretical restraints": "Literary interpretation becomes a 
game of tennis played without a net and on a court with no back I ines." 
The question becomes, then, does lser's critique of lngarden indicate a 
rejection of validity in interpretation, a central tenet of the American critical 
tradition? This does not seem to be the case. lser rejects only the notion that 
each text offers just one valid concretization, one correct meaning. For lser, 
there is a prestructured range of meanings that the reader can validly assemble 
from the same text: "the structure of the text allows for different ways of 
fulfillment." lser's stand is simply (and conveniently) another version of the 
critical pluralism quite respectable within traditional American literary theory 
(as most recently demonstrated by Wayne Booth's Critical Understanding). 
But what is not acceptable in this tradition is a critical pluralism without 
limits; note Booth's subtitle, "The Powers and Limits of Pluralism," and the 
extended discussion in Critical Inquiry among Booth, M. H. Abrams, J. Hillis 
Miller, and others over "The Limits of Pluralism." In American theory, valid-
ity in interpretation has been guaranteed most often by constraints in the 
literary text that limit the range of permissible meanings to be derived from 
that text. lser's account of reading supplies just the kind of textual constraints 
that make most critics comfortable. These constraints are the manipulative 
devices for ensuring that the reader can be properly guided: "Although the 
reader must participate in the assembly of meaning by realizing the structure 
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inherent in the text, it must not be forgotten that he stands outside the text. 
His position must therefore be manipulated by the text if his viewpoint is to 
be properly guided." 
For lser. the text's arrangement of perspectives guides the reader as he 
attempts to project a consistent pattern resolving the tensions among the 
various norms distributed among those perspectives. "The interaction fails 
if ... the reader's projections superimpose themselves unimpeded upon the 
text." How exactly does the arrangement of perspectives guide the reader's 
activities and impede his projections? Between and within the textual perspec· 
tives, there are blanks (previously called gaps in The Implied Reader). These 
blanks are vacancies in the overall system of the text. "They indicate that the 
different segments of the text are to be connected, even though the text itself 
does not say so. They are the unseen joints of the text, and as they mark off 
schemata and textual perspectives from one another. they simultaneously 
trigger acts of ideation [image-building) on the reader's part." The blanks 
"function virtually as instructions" in the "theme-and-horizon structure" of 
the reading process. As the reader moves through the text, he constantly shihs 
from one perspective to another. The perspective he assumes at any one 
moment becomes the "theme" which is read against the "horizon" of the 
previous perspectives in which he had been situated; in the Tom Jones exam-
ple given above, the Allworthy perspective is first a theme, then part of the 
horizon for judging the Blifil perspective, and then a theme again but this 
time one that is interpreted against the changed horizon that now contains the 
perspective of Blifil. The reader fills the blanks between perspectives according 
to the theme-and-horizon structure, which guides him to negate or to modify 
each thematic perspective in light of the accumulated horizon of previous 
perspectives. The perspectives, blanks, and theme-and-horizon structure consti-
tute the constraints that lser's account places on the reader's interpretation of 
the whole text. 
This description provides an adequate composite of the textual constraints 
lser presents. In passing, I would like to comment briefly on the status of 
these constraints in order to clarify the foundations of all such textual 
theories. The underlying basis of the interpretive constraints lser proposes is 
the negating relationship among the perspectives. Negation characterizes the 
connections that the reader projects to fill the blanks between segments, and 
it describes the horizon's relation to the theme during any moment in the 
time-flow of reading. The reader's "process of formulation is continually 
guided by negation." In each case, what is negated (challenged, modified, etc.) 
is one perspective by another. And for lser a perspective's specific negating 
function in any particular text is an uninterpreted given in that text, con-
straining the reader's assembly of meaning. For example, lser lists four basic 
types of perspective arrangements for narrative texts - counterbalance, oppo-
sition, echelon, and serial. It is not necessary to describe how each of these 
arrangements functions. What is important here is that these relations between 
perspectives, as they appear in any particular narrative text, are not intersub-
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jective givens as lser supposes. Rather they are constructs varying according to 
an on-going interpretation. This means they cannot serve as prior textual 
constraints on that interpretive work because they are already its products. 
Whether the hero's perspective counterbalances a minor character's or vice 
versa is always an interpretation and never a given in the text as lser holds. Of 
course, I could go even further and say that not only is the relation between 
the hero and a min or character an interpretive construct, but so is the "fact" 
that a certain character is designated "the hero" and another only "a minor 
character." The same holds for even the apparently more basic "given," the 
individual character in a text. And so on. It's interpretation all the way down. 
However, the textual theorist must start somewhere. Once such a theorist has 
the category of a "prior and independent text," he must begin filling it with 
textual elements, givens that will constrain its interpretation. These "givens" 
form the enabling fiction of any theory of the text. lser's enabling fiction is 
the negative relation between textual perspectives. With this "given" he sup-
ports his functionalist model of the text and his whole phenomenology of 
reading. But the problematic nature of lser's constraints in no way undermines 
the persuasiveness of his reading model within the American critical tradition 
because all the textual theories in that tradition also build their models of 
independent texts upon the fiction of uninterpreted givens. 
It might at first seem a bit odd to say that lser promotes the notion of an 
independent text, even in the problematic way I have described. After all, his 
is a phenomenological theory of reading, and he continually emphasizes how 
the subject-object division is destroyed during the reading process. But these 
claims must be examined closely. For in lser's account, it is the literary work 
and not the text that is dependent on the reader for its existence: "the 
literary work has two poles, which we might call the artistic and the aesthetic: 
the artistic pole is the author's text and the aesthetic is the realization accom-
plished by the reader. In view of this polarity, it is clear that the work itself 
cannot be identical with the text or with the concretization, but must be 
situated somewhere between the two." The text remains independent and 
prior to the reader's activities as it initiates, guides, and corrects the reader's 
concretization of the literary work. I would argue, then, that despite his 
critiques of New Criticism and lngarden, lser ultimately demonstrates that he 
shares with Wellek, Brooks, and Booth a belief in interpretive validity guaran-
teed by constraints in a prior and independent text; and these shared assump-
tions make lser's detailed account of reading extremely attractive to tradi-
tional literary theorists in America. 
Unfortunately, by presenting a reading model that is easily adapted to the 
American critical tradition, lser is in danger of undercutting one of the pur-
poses for writing his book: in his preface he suggests that the "anthropological 
side of literary criticism" deserves more attention, and he hopes that some 
hints in The Act of Reading might encourage a concern for the "actual func-
tion of literature in the overall make-up of man." Within today's sterile and 
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restnct1ve critical discourse, these are daring, even courageous goals, and 
indeed many of lser's discussions do direct our attention to how literature 
functions in this humanistic way. His account of literary effect, of how litera· 
ture changes its readers, certainly moves in this direction. But this fine 
attempt might be erased because of the text-centered theory of reading that is 
its foundation. The emphasis on textual constraints and the prestructuring of 
effect, combined with the lack of examples of differing interpretations and 
significant changes in readers, all of this will make it quite easy for lser's 
theory to be grafted onto the American critical tradition without really affect-
ing the text-centered, a-rhetorical criticism and theory that tradition fosters. 
Thus, while it actually contains the seeds of a radically social and rhetorical 
approach, The Act of Reading is persuasive because it appears to be safe: it 
gives the American critic just enough of the reader but not too much. Or, 
more exactly, it provides an acceptable model of the text partially disguised as 
an innovative account of reading. Very economically, then, it fulfills both 
needs of current American theory: it incorporates the reader into a theory of 
literature while it maintains the traditional American valorization of the 
autonomous text. lser allows American theorists to have their text and reader 
too. 
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